Creating Moves to Opportunity:
Experimental Evidence on Barriers to Neighborhood Choice

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Seattle Housing Authority, King County Housing Authority,
MDRC, and J-PAL North America

January 2023
Motivation: Four Facts on Neighborhoods and Economic Opportunity

1. Children’s prospects for upward income mobility vary substantially across neighborhoods
The Geography of Upward Mobility in Seattle and King County

Average Income at Age 35 for Children with Parents Earning $27,000 (25th percentile)

- North Queen Anne: $41k
- Central District: $24k
- Normandy Park: $47k
- Des Moines: $31k

Source: Chetty, Friedman, Hendren, Jones, Porter (2018)
Motivation: Four Facts on Neighborhoods and Economic Opportunity

1. Children’s prospects for upward income mobility vary substantially across neighborhoods

2. Moving to better neighborhoods earlier in childhood improves children’s outcomes in adulthood significantly
Estimates of Childhood Exposure Effects

United States

Source: Chetty, Friedman, Hendren, Jones, Porter (2018)

Australia

Evidence of age-varying exposure effects
Evidence of age-invariant selection effects

Source: Deutscher (2018)

Montreal, Canada

Source: Laliberté (2018)

Denmark

Source: Faurschou (2018)

MTO: Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, LA, NYC

Source: Chetty, Hendren, Katz (AER 2016)

Chicago Public Housing Demolitions

Source: Chyn (AER 2018)
Motivation: Four Facts on Neighborhoods and Economic Opportunity

1. Children’s prospects for upward income mobility vary substantially across neighborhoods

2. Moving to better neighborhoods earlier in childhood improves children’s outcomes in adulthood significantly

3. Low-income families who receive housing vouchers predominantly live in low-opportunity neighborhoods
Most Common Locations of Families with Housing Vouchers 2015-2017

25 most common tracts where voucher holders with children leased before the CMTO experiment

Mean Household Income Rank in Adulthood

- > 57 ($51k)
- 48 ($40k)
- < 36 ($27k)
Motivation: Four Facts on Neighborhoods and Economic Opportunity

1. Children’s prospects for upward income mobility vary substantially across neighborhoods.

2. Moving to better neighborhoods earlier in childhood improves children’s outcomes in adulthood significantly.

3. Low-income families who receive housing vouchers currently live predominantly in low-opportunity neighborhoods.

4. Differences in rent do not explain why low-income families live in low-opportunity areas.
The Price of Opportunity in King County: Upward Mobility vs. Rents, by Census Tract

The scatter plot illustrates the relationship between the mean household income ranks of children with low-income (25th percentile) parents and median 2-bedroom rent in 2015, across different census tracts. The data points are color-coded by location: West Kent, Federal Way, Newport, and Woodinville. The plot shows a trend indicating that higher median rents correlate with lower mean income ranks for children of low-income parents.
Question: Why Don’t Low-Income Families Move to Opportunity?

- Two classes of explanations:

1. **Preferences**: families may prefer to stay in current neighborhoods because of other amenities (e.g., commute time, proximity to family)

2. **Barriers**: families may be unable to find housing in high-opportunity areas because of lack of information, search frictions, or landlords’ tastes

- If barriers are what is driving segregation, can we reduce them through changes in affordable housing policy?
Randomized trial to develop and test scalable strategies to reduce barriers that housing choice voucher recipients may face in moving to high-opportunity areas in Seattle and King County
Housing Choice Voucher Program: Institutional Background

- 2.2m families in U.S use housing vouchers each year
- Administered by local housing authorities

Typical features:

- Income cutoff for eligibility (~30% of area median income)
- Waitlists: typically 2+ years
- Limited time to use voucher: typically 4 months
- Voucher subsidizes tenant’s rent
  - Tenant typically pays 30% of income toward rent and utilities
  - Landlord receives rent up to a cap based on “fair market rent”
- Inspection process for landlords
Definition of Opportunity Areas

- Experimental intervention seeks to help voucher families move to opportunity areas

- First step: define a set of neighborhoods as “opportunity areas”

- Starting point: identify Census tracts with rates of upward income mobility roughly in top third of distribution within Seattle (SHA) and King County (KCHA)

- Adjust definitions in collaboration with housing authorities to account for two issues:
  - Neighborhood change (using test score data to assess stability)
  - Creating contiguous areas
Designation of High-Opportunity Neighborhoods

Moving at Birth from Low to High-Opportunity Area →
Mean Predicted Earnings Gain of $3,400 per year (13.3%)
Opportunity Atlas vs. Other Measures of Economic Opportunity

Opportunity Atlas Upward Mobility

Kirwan Child Opportunity Index

Population-Weighted Correlation Across Tracts: 0.30
Treatment Interventions

- **CUSTOMIZED SEARCH ASSISTANCE**
  On average, non-profit staff spend **6 hours** with each household

- **DIRECT LANDLORD ENGAGEMENT**
  **47%** of rentals in high-opportunity areas made through links via non-profit staff

- **SHORT-TERM FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE**
  Average financial assistance of **$1,000** for security deposits, application fees, etc.

Program Cost: $2,670 per family issued a voucher (2.2% of average voucher payments over 7 years)

*Note: Families not required to move to high-opportunity areas*
Key Elements in the CMTO Intervention

**CUSTOMIZED SEARCH ASSISTANCE**
- **High-opportunity area education** to increase families’ knowledge about high-opportunity areas.
- **Rental application coaching** to increase families’ competitiveness for rental units by addressing credit history and preparing a narrative.
- **Housing locator services** to help families identify suitable units in high-opportunity areas.

**INCREASED LANDLORD ENGAGEMENT**
- **Cultivate relationships** with landlords in designated high-opportunity areas to create housing opportunities for CMTO families.
- **Expedite lease-up processes** by completing PHA required documents and conducting housing inspections more quickly.
- **Insurance fund** to mitigate risks of property damage.

**SHORT-TERM FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE**
- Grants to **defray move-in expenses**, such as application fees and security deposits (on average $1,000).
Intervention Process Timeline

**Family Contacted**
Notified of selection from waitlist

**Intake Appointment**
Consent
Randomization
Baseline survey

**Nonprofit Staff Meet with Families and Landlords**
Rental application coaching
Opportunity area education
Visiting locations

**Voucher Issued**

**Unit Selected**
Family approved by landlord for unit

**Lease Signed**

**Lease Up**
Receive paperwork and financial assistance (e.g. assistance for deposit)

**PHA**

**Nonprofit**

**Family Milestone**
# Creating Moves to Opportunity Program Costs

## A. Total Costs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost Description</th>
<th>Average Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cost of CMTO services per issuance</td>
<td>$2,668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of CMTO services per lease / average 7-year HAP costs per lease</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## B. Costs by Service Category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost Description</th>
<th>Average Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cost of CMTO financial assistance per issuance</td>
<td>$1,057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of CMTO program services per issuance</td>
<td>$1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of PHA CMTO administration per issuance</td>
<td>$392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost savings of PHA services paid by CMTO</td>
<td>($281)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## C. Housing Assistance Payment (HAP) Costs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost Description</th>
<th>Average Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average incremental HAP costs per lease per year</td>
<td>$2,519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average incremental HAP costs per leased family over 7 years</td>
<td>$17,633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Incremental HAP + CMTO services per lease) / average 7-year HAP costs per lease</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## D. Phase 2 Treatment Arms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment Arm Description</th>
<th>Average Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T1 (Financial Assistance + Info) cost per issuance</td>
<td>$424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T2 (Reduced Services) cost per issuance</td>
<td>$720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T3 (CMTO) cost per issuance</td>
<td>$2,778</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Experimental Design

- Sample frame: families with at least one child below age 15 who were issued vouchers in either Seattle or King County

- Phase 1: April 2018 to April 2019
  - 430 families, split randomly into control (standard services) and treatment

- Phase 2: July 2019 to March 2020
  - 287 families, split randomly into control and three treatment groups to unbundle mechanisms
Sample frame: families with at least one child below age 15 who were issued vouchers in either Seattle or King County

Phase 1: Randomly sampled 202 families for open-ended qualitative interviews
   - 80% overall response rate, N = 161

Phase 2: Targeted 130 families across the three treatment groups for interviews
   - 70% overall response rate, N = 90
## Summary Statistics for Experimental Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Head of Household Characteristics</th>
<th>Pooled Mean</th>
<th>Control Mean</th>
<th>Treatment Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Household Income</td>
<td>$20,275</td>
<td>$20,223</td>
<td>$20,321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Black</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>48.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% High School Grad</td>
<td>78.4</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>84.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of Household's Age</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children’s Mean Age</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Homeless</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Currently Working</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>52.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Satisfied with Current Neighborhood</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>53.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Unsatisfied with Any Child's Current School</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### F-Test for Treat-Control Balance:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>F-Statistic</th>
<th>P-Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.200</td>
<td>0.197</td>
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</table>
Outline

1. Program Description and Experimental Design
2. Treatment Effects
3. Mechanisms
4. Conclusion
Fraction of Families Who Leased Units in High Opportunity Areas

Control: 15.4%
Treatment: 53.2%
Difference: 37.8 pp
SE: (4.2)
Historical mean rate: 11.6%

Difference: 37.8 pp
SE: (4.2)

Fraction of Families Who Leased Units in High Opportunity Areas
Fraction Who Leased Any Unit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Control</th>
<th>Treatment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>86.8%</td>
<td>87.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Difference: 0.5 pp
SE: (3.3)
Fraction Who Leased Units in High Opportunity Areas, Conditional on Leasing Up Using Voucher

Control: 17.8%
Treatment: 61.0%

Difference: 43.2 pp, SE: (4.6)
Destination Locations for Families that Leased Units Using Housing Vouchers
Predicted Impacts on Upward Mobility

- How much do these moves improve children’s rates of upward income mobility?

- Cannot directly answer this question yet, but can make a prediction based on historical data on upward mobility by tract from the Opportunity Atlas.
Upward Mobility in Destination Neighborhoods

Mean Household Income Rank (p=25) in Neighborhood
Control

Treatment

Difference: 1.6 ranks
SE: (0.4)
Predicted Impact on Upward Mobility

- Treatment effect on observed rate of upward mobility in destination tracts = 1.6 percentiles

- Translate this into predicted causal impact on earnings for a given child whose family is induced to move to a high-opportunity area by CMTO by making two adjustments

  1. Chetty, Friedman, Hendren, Jones, and Porter (2018) estimate that 62% of the observational variation in upward mobility across tracts is due to causal effects

  2. 37.8% of families induced to move to high-opportunity neighborhoods by treatment

- Adjusting for these two factors → causal effect of $1.6 \times \frac{0.62}{0.378} \approx 2.6$ percentiles

  - About $3,000 (8.4\%)$ in annual household income or $212,000$ (undiscounted) over a child’s lifetime

- Alternative scaling: moving to a high-opportunity area reduces the intergenerational persistence of income (p25-75 gap in outcomes) by about 20\%
Treatment Effects By Race and Ethnicity

- **Black Non-Hispanic**
  - Control: 11.2%
  - Treatment: 48.0%
  - Diff.: 36.8% (5.9)

- **White Non-Hispanic**
  - Control: 19.6%
  - Treatment: 62.3%
  - Diff.: 42.7% (9.0)

- **Other Race/Ethnicity**
  - Control: 19.6%
  - Treatment: 56.6%
  - Diff.: 37.0% (8.5)
Satisfaction with New Neighborhoods
Based on Surveys Six Months Post-Move

“Very Satisfied” with New Neighborhood?

Control: 45.5%
Treatment: 64.2%
Difference: 18.7 pp
SE: (10.1)

“Very Sure” Will Stay?

Control: 30.3%
Treatment: 47.7%
Difference: 17.4 pp
SE: (9.8)
Satisfaction in New Neighborhood by Type of Area Leased In

“Very Satisfied” with New Neighborhood?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moved to Non-Opp. Area</th>
<th>Moved to Opp. Area</th>
<th>Control</th>
<th>Treatment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>n = 23</td>
<td>88.9%</td>
<td>n = 9</td>
<td>73.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.4%</td>
<td>Diff. = 30.3</td>
<td>(16.5)</td>
<td>(10.4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“Very Sure” Will Stay?

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<th>Treatment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>n = 23</td>
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<td>53.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>Diff. = 49.3</td>
<td>(16.5)</td>
<td>(11.1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Persistence of Treatment Effects, Conditional on Leasing Up Using Voucher
Up to Three Years Post-Move

Change in Treatment Effect from Initial Move to Feb 7, 2022: -7.6 pp
SE: (7.3)
Implications for Models of Neighborhood Choice

- Experimental results suggest that barriers play a central role in neighborhood choice and prevent low-income families from moving to high-opportunity neighborhoods that they prefer ex-post

- Frictionless model would require that 43% of people happen to have (net) willingness to pay for low-opportunity areas between $0 and $2,670 (cost of treatment)
61.0% have WTP < $2,670 for low-opportunity neighborhood
17.8% have WTP < $0 for low-opportunity neighborhood

Net Willingness to Pay for Low-Opportunity Area
$2,670 (cost of CMTO program)

Distribution of Preferences for High Opportunity Neighborhoods
Implied by Frictionless Model
Implications for Models of Neighborhood Choice

- Experimental results suggest that barriers play a central role in neighborhood choice and prevent low-income families from moving to high-opportunity neighborhoods that they prefer ex-post
  - Frictionless model would require that 43% of people happen to have (net) willingness to pay for low-opportunity areas between $0 and $2,670 (cost of treatment)

- These barriers could potentially be captured in a standard model of housing search (e.g., Wheaton 1990; Kennan and Walker 2011) with sufficiently large search costs
  - Important to unpack what these costs are to understand how to reduce them
Outline

1. Program Description and Experimental Design
2. Treatment Effects
3. Mechanisms
4. Conclusion
Mechanisms

- What are the barriers families face in moving to higher-opportunity areas?

- Two quantitative approaches:
  1. Second phase of experiment with unbundled treatments: financial assistance only and light-touch (non-customized) services
  2. Quasi-experimental analysis of other policy changes (e.g., increased payment standards)
## Summary Statistics for Experimental Sample – Phase 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Head of Household Characteristics</th>
<th>Pooled Mean</th>
<th>Control Mean</th>
<th>Treatment Arm 1 Mean</th>
<th>Treatment Arm 2 Mean</th>
<th>Treatment Arm 3 Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annual Household Income ($)</td>
<td>$19,260</td>
<td>$17,370</td>
<td>$16,844</td>
<td>$21,845</td>
<td>$20,675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Black Non-Hispanic</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>40.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Less than High School Grad</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (years)</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children's Average Age</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Homeless</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Currently Working</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>61.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Satisfied with Current Neighborhood</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>55.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Unsatisfied with Any Child's Current School</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>16.4</td>
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**Number of Observations**

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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>287</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>77</td>
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**F-Test for Treat-Control Balance:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>F-Statistic</th>
<th>P-Value</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.994</td>
<td>0.494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.983</td>
<td>0.511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.563</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Fraction Who Leased Units in High Opportunity Areas in Phase 2 of the CMTO Experiment

- Control: 12.5%
- T1: 21.4%
- T2: 26.3%
- T3: 53.3%

Differences:
- Diff. = 8.9 (6.4)
- Diff. = 13.8 (6.5)
- Diff. = 40.8 (6.9)
We also conducted a qualitative study of 161 families in Phase 1 and 90 families in Phase 2 interviewed for two hours each during search process and post-move.

Key lessons from these interviews (based on systematic coding of 8,000 pages of transcripts):

1. **[Scarcity]** Most families have extremely limited time and resources to search [Mullainathan and Shafir 2013]

2. **[Customization]** Case workers’ ability to respond to each family’s **specific** needs is crucial above and beyond standardized resources.
# Five Key Mechanisms Underlying the Treatment Effects

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<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of Observations</strong></td>
<td><strong>Phase 1</strong></td>
<td><strong>All Treated Families</strong></td>
<td><strong>Phase 2</strong></td>
<td><strong>Treatment Arm 1</strong> (Incentivized Information)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
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<td>---------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Treated Families who Moved to High-Opportunity Nbhds.</strong></td>
<td>74</td>
<td>60.8%</td>
<td>31.1%</td>
<td>73.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All Treated Families</strong></td>
<td>117</td>
<td>50.4%</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
<td>53.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Treatment Arm 1</strong> (Incentivized Information)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Treatment Arm 2</strong> (Reduced Support Services)</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>38.2%</td>
<td>32.4%</td>
<td>52.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Treatment Arm 3</strong> (Full Customized Services)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>68.4%</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
<td>52.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Illustrative Quotes

Emotional/Psychological Support

“It was this whole flood of relief. It was this whole flood of, “I don’t know how I’m going to do this” and “I don’t know what I’m going to do” and “This isn’t working,” and yeah…I think it was just the supportive nature of having lots of conversations with Megan.” – Jackie

Brokering with Landlords

“When you find a place, I will come with you and we will help you to fill out the application. I will talk with the landlord, I will help you to do a lot of stuff, that maybe sometimes will be complicated.” – Leah

Short-Term Financial Assistance

“I’m not going to be able to pay here and then there [in the new apartment] … They were able to get me more money, so that they would pay more of my first portion of my rent. Because they understood the situation that I was in.” – Jennifer
Impacts of Financial Incentives: Evidence From Changes in Rent Payment Standards

- Study two changes in payment standards that preceded CMTO experiment using a difference-in-differences design

1. March 2016: King County switched from a two-tier to five-tier payment standard, effectively increasing payment standards in more expensive areas of the county.

2. February 2018: Seattle effectively increased payment standards in areas designated as “high opportunity” by making a supplemental payment to families with children.
CMTO Has Much Larger Impact on Moves to Opportunity than Small Area Payment Standards

Effect of 5-Tier Reform: -3.59 ranks
(5.75)
Effect of Increase in Payment Standards for High-Opportunity Areas in Seattle
Difference-in-Difference Estimate

Note: data shown from May 2018 onward are based on control group in CMTO experiment

DD Estimate: 10.6 pp (5.01)
Conclusions

1. Residential segregation of low-income families in the U.S. is driven more heavily by constraints than ex-ante preferences.

2. Redesigning existing affordable housing policies to reduce such barriers could reduce segregation and increase upward mobility substantially.
H. R. 5793

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
JULY 11, 2018

AN ACT

To authorize the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to carry out a housing choice voucher mobility demonstration to encourage families receiving such voucher assistance to move to lower-poverty areas and expand access to opportunity areas.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Housing Choice Voucher Mobility Demonstration Act of 2018".

SEC. 2. HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHER MOBILITY DEMONSTRATION.

(a) Authority.—The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (in this section referred to as the "Secretary") may carry out a mobility demonstration program to enable public housing agencies to administer housing choice voucher assistance under section 8(o) of the United States Housing Act of 1937 (42 U.S.C. 1437f(o)) in a manner designed to encourage families receiving such voucher assistance to move to lower-poverty areas and expand access to opportunity areas.

(b) Selection of PHAs.—

(1) REQUIREMENTS.—The Secretary shall establish requirements for public housing agencies to participate in the demonstration program under this section, which provide that the following public housing agencies may participate:
Conclusions

1. Residential segregation of low-income families in the U.S. is driven more heavily by constraints than ex-ante preferences

2. Redesigning existing affordable housing policies to reduce such barriers could reduce segregation and increase upward mobility substantially

3. More broadly, social determinants of choice appear to be extremely important, beyond traditional financial considerations
Seattle and King County Housing Authorities
Andria Lazaga, Sarah Oppenheimer, Jenny Le, Jodi Speer

MDRC
James Riccio, Nandita Verma, Jonathan Bigelow, Gilda Azurdia

J-PAL North America
Jacob Binder, Graham Simpson, Kristen Watkins

Opportunity Insights
Federico Gonzalez Rodriguez, Jamie Gracie, Martin Koenen, Sarah Merchant, Max Pienkny, Peter Ruhm, James Stratton

Johns Hopkins Fieldwork Team
Paige Ackman, Christina Ambrosino, Divya Baron, Joseph Boselovic, Erin Carl, Devin Collins, Hannah Curtis, Christine Jang, Akanksha Jayathi, Nicole Kovski, Melanie Nadon, Kiara Nerenberg, Daphne Moraga, Bronte Nevins, Simon Robbenolt, Brianna So, Maria Vignau-Loria, Allison Young, MEF Associates

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From Jasmine, 7 years old, whose family moved to a high-opportunity area in Seattle
Appendix Figures
Preliminary vs Final Version of Opportunity Atlas Upward Mobility Measure

Final Version of Opportunity Atlas

Preliminary Forecasts Used to Define High-Opportunity Areas

Population-Weighted Correlation Across Tracts: 0.74
Map of Origin Tracts for Voucher Recipients
### Satisfaction in Neighborhood at Baseline by Type of Area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Area</th>
<th>Control</th>
<th>Treatment</th>
<th>Diff.</th>
<th>Sample Size</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moved to Non-Opp. Area</td>
<td>25.6% (n=129)</td>
<td>25.0% (n=36)</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved to Opp. Area</td>
<td>23.9% (n=71)</td>
<td>20.8% (n=106)</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved to Non-Opp. Area</td>
<td>20.9% (n=129)</td>
<td>13.9% (n=36)</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moved to Opp. Area</td>
<td>21.1% (n=71)</td>
<td>18.9% (n=106)</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Post-Move Treatment Effects on Neighborhood Satisfaction

Satisfaction with New Neighborhood

Certainty about Wanting to Stay in New Neighborhood

Difference in % Very Satisfied: **18.7pp**
SE: (10.1)

Difference in % Very Sure Want to Stay: **17.4pp**
SE: (9.8)
Control Mean = 45th Pctile
T1 Mean = 45th Pctile
T2 Mean = 45th Pctile
T3 Mean = 47th Pctile

Upward Mobility (Predicted Income Rank in Adulthood of Child with Parents at 25th Percentile) in Destination Tract

Distribution of Upward Mobility in Destination Tracts
Fraction Who Leased **Any** Unit in Phase 2 of the CMTO Experiment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Fraction Who Leased</th>
<th>Diff.</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>65.8%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T1</td>
<td>89.3%</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T2</td>
<td>82.3%</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T3</td>
<td>89.7%</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Fraction Who Leased Units in High Opportunity Areas, Conditional on Leasing Up Using Voucher, in Phase 2 of the CMTO Experiment

Control  T1  T2  T3

19.1%  24.0%  32.2%  59.3%

Diff. = 4.9 (8.1)
Diff. = 13.1 (8.5)
Diff. = 40.2 (8.3)
Changes to King County Housing Authority Payment Standards in March 2016

Increase in Max Rent for 2BR Apt.